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Awakening Africa’s Sleeping 
Giant? The Potentials and the 
Pitfalls1 
In 2009 the World Bank published a report entitled Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant: Prospects for Commercial Agriculture in the 
Guinea Savannah Zone and Beyond. The report 
highlights the agricultural potential of Africa’s 
Guinea Savannah (henceforth GS) zone, which 
it describes as “one of the largest underused 
agricultural land reserves in the world” (p2). It 
argues that the time has come for this potential 
to be realized, noting the strengthening demand 
for agricultural commodities both in world 
markets and within Africa, where population 
growth, rising incomes and urbanization are 
driving demand for staple foods as well as for 
l ivestock and hor ticultural  products. 
Macroeconomic and sectoral (taxation) policies 
are also increasingly favourable to agricultural 
investment within Africa. 
The report draws lessons from post-1960 
agricultural development experiences in two 
other regions once considered low potential 
agricultural areas, but now home to agricultural 
export industries of global importance: the 
Brazilian cerrado, where production is domi-
nated by large-scale farmers, and the Northeast 
Region of Thailand, where production is domi-
nated by smallholders.  I t  recognises 
that considerable challenges will have to be 
overcome if Africa’s GS zone is to emulate their 
success and also that such success could be 
accompanied by some adverse environmental 
and possibly social impacts. However, it argues 
that, with adequate planning and policy, the 
worst of these eff ects can be mitigated. Priorities 
for public intervention thus include: land poli-
cies that protect property rights in an equitable 
manner; investments in agricultural research, 
education and infrastructure; institutions to 
promote smallholder access to markets and 
services (including fi nance), and enhanced envi-
ronmental monitoring and management. With 
these in place, “opportunities abound for 
farmers in Africa to regain international compet-
itiveness, especially in light of projected stronger 
demand in world markets for agricultural 
commodities over the long term” (p2).
Is the Guinea Savannah really a “still largely 
unexploited area” or will eﬀ orts to exploit this 
zone through intensive agriculture displace 
other productive, but largely unseen 
activities?
Critical assessment of the report at the Future 
Agricultures – SOAS workshop highlighted the 
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heterogeneity of the GS zone. It contains several 
distinct savannah ecologies, including sudanian 
savannahs, miombo woodlands and flooded 
grasslands (Post 2010). In northern Nigeria, 
south-west Burkina Faso and the Upper East 
Region of Ghana population densities are high, 
whereas in the remainder - a vast area, which is 
the main focus of the report - they are low 
(Amanor 2010). In the former areas – admittedly 
a small fraction of the GS zone - smallholder 
agricultural intensification is already underway 
in response to rising market demand (Mortimore 
2010). Common activities across the remainder 
of the zone include extensive (often shifting) 
crop cultivation, livestock herding and 
harvesting of environmental (especially tree) 
resources – all of which are important to the 
livelihoods of the (poor) inhabitants of the zone. 
Recent experience with large-scale land deals, 
some of which have been within the GS, shows 
not just that large-scale land allocations for 
agriculture can displace such activities, but also 
that compensation payments for those affected 
are often inadequate (Hall 2010). Women may 
be particularly affected by the loss of access to 
both extensive crop cultivation opportunities 
and environmental resources. Paradoxically, 
however, whilst people are already gaining liveli-
hoods from the GS, it is the low populations in 
and around the GS that pose a challenge to 
equitable development of the zone, especially 
given the high labour requirements of small-
holder agriculture.
Can internationally competitive agriculture be 
established and sustained in the Guinea 
Savannah? If so, what is required for this?
Rising food imports into Sub-Saharan Africa 
nowithstanding, the report argues persuasively 
that African agriculture can be competitive in 
rapidly growing domestic markets (i.e. at import 
parity prices). There is also some export potential 
from the GS zone, for example cotton, and world 
market conditions for many crops are likely to 
be favourable for some time. The report also 
recognises that, as in the Brazilian cerrado, soils 
are poor. Competitive agriculture thus needs 
appropriate soil fertility management practices 
(hence research) and input supply systems. 
Slingerland and Giller (2010) emphasise the 
complexity of the soil fertility management chal-
lenge, with differentiation across both house-
holds (for socio-economic reasons) and plots 
(i.e. within households) as well as across 
geographic areas. Growing market demand for 
agricultural produce may encourage producers 
to address these soil fertility issues. However, 
evidence from elsewhere (including Machakos: 
Tiffen et.al. 1994) shows that public support 
services may also be desirable and/or 
necessary.
The report also argues that commercial agri-
culture in the GS should be predominantly 
rainfed, which again seems sensible. Only large-
scale farms and the best-capitalised small-
holders will be able to afford irrigation 
themselves. According to Lankford (2010), a 
desirable combination for the GS is a rainfed 
system with supplementary irrigation when the 
rains are scarce - in poor seasons or when there 
are gaps in the rains. However, such optimisation 
of irrigation water use is almost impossible to 
achieve on medium to large-scale irrigation 
systems for smallholders or where many small 
and micro-systems coalesce into larger areas. 
Such systems tend both to be costly and to 
overuse water, hence ultimately causing scarcity 
downstream and other environmental problems 
e.g. salinisation. Lankford (2010) argues that it 
would be better to direct scarce water to villages 
and towns, thereby assuring the water supply 
necessary for urban growth, which in turn will 
service a growing rainfed agricultural sector and 
stimulate demand for agricultural products. 
Nevertheless, rainfall is variable in the GS, so 
intensification of smallholder agricultural 
production under rainfed conditions is likely to 
need both research into more drought tolerant 
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crop varieties and development of appropriate 
micro-insurance products.
Arguably one of the big gaps in the Sleeping 
Giant report is consideration of the role of live-
stock in future development scenarios. Demand 
for livestock products within Africa can be 
expected to grow as incomes rise, whilst for 
producers in mixed crop-livestock systems cattle 
can contribute both animal traction (essential 
if smallholder households are to expand their 
areas under cultivation) and manure. Whilst 
fi nancial systems remain weak, livestock also 
perform a valuable savings function for enter-
prise growth. In turn, a growing livestock 
industry (possibly poultry even more so than 
beef?) could stimulate demand for soybean, 
cotton cake and maize – all crops with produc-
tion potential within the GS. Rushton et.al. 
(2010) emphasise that diseases remain an 
important constraint to livestock production 
within the GS. In particular, much of the area 
remains infected by tsetse fl y which is the main 
vector for both human (sleeping sickness) and 
livestock trypanosomiasis. Large-scale bush 
clearance removes the habitat for tsetse fl y, as 
has happened over time in the more densely 
populated parts of the West African GS. However, 
public eradication programmes, to stimulate 
pioneer settlement of new areas by agricultural 
producers, are costly and progress can be 
reversed (as recently in Gokwe, Zimbabwe) if 
cultivation declines. Meanwhile, an array of 
other diseases aff ecting diff erent types of live-
stock are also prevalent in the GS. Restoring the 
strength and quality of veterinary services (a 
major casualty of structural adjustment) is a 
prerequisite for controlling these.
Major investment in transport infrastructure 
is also essential if African agricultural producers 
are to increase their competitiveness, not just 
on global markets but also against imports 
where major centres of demand are located at 
the coast. More than anything else, it is these 
investments that will “open up” the GS. The 
question of what needs to be in place prior to 
such investments being made, so as to ensure 
that the processes thereby set in motion are 
pro-poor and environmentally responsible, is 
addressed below. For landlocked countries, 
infrastructure investment raises the challenge 
of regional (supra-national) policy coordination. 
Similar coordination is also desirable for agri-
cultural research targeted at the GS and also if 
labour demand for production expansion in 
previously sparsely populated regions is to be 
met through migration from neighbouring 
countries. 
What are the major environmental constraints 
to the promotion of commercialised agricul-
ture in the Guinea Savannah and can these be 
managed appropriately?
Mortimore (2010) argues that this question is 
too narrow! Instead we should be asking what 
development pathways for the GS are most 
likely to reduce poverty and protect the health 
of the ecosystems on which society depends. 
He suggests that the Northern Nigeria model, 
whilst not perfect, is as good as any other avail-
able: the agricultural system is smallholder-
based, the natural resource base is managed 
through decentralised institutions and both 
production practices and natural resource 
management institutions respond organically 
to growth in population and market demand. 
Other contributions to discussion at the Future 
Agricultures – SOAS workshop suggested that 
development trajectories within the GS should 
recognise the importance of diverse tree species 
within the landscape (for economic as well as 
social and environmental benefi ts), the potential 
of a variety of crops and cropping systems 
(looking well beyond maize, cassava, rice, 
soybean, cotton and sugar that were examined 
in detail in the report), the value of integrated 
crop-livestock systems and the crucial role of 
“wetlands in drylands” to serve as key resources 
for agricultural and pastoral production in 
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complex, risk-prone environments. This will 
require not just strong local institutions for 
natural resource management, but also delib-
erative fora within which competing visions can 
be debated and competing interest groups can 
dialogue.
On the narrower question posed above, the 
report appears to underestimate the likely envi-
ronmental and health consequences of agricul-
tural intensification in currently low population 
density areas of the GS. Jones (2010) highlights 
the high biodiversity of the GS zones and the 
high number of animal, bird and amphibian 
species threatened with extinction. Globally, 
increasing populations and agricultural inten-
sification (independent of population effects) 
have been identified as major drivers of biodi-
versity loss. Whilst there is an impressive 
commitment to the establishment and mainte-
nance of protected areas in some countries of 
the GS, perhaps most notably Tanzania, addi-
tional measures may well be required. However, 
these will need (time-consuming) location-
specific research to understand which species 
are threatened and the measures that could 
assist their survival (e.g. migration corridors, 
local variants of wildlife-friendly farming). 
Meanwhile, biodiversity in the GS stands out as 
a global public good in part because other parts 
of the world have already wiped out so much 
of their biodiversity. The commitment to 
protected areas notwithstanding, is there a 
misalignment of international and local incen-
tives here?
Poor health remains a significant burden for 
African communities within the Guinea 
Savannah and can act as a brake to economic 
development. Infectious and parasitic diseases 
pose the greatest threats. However, Post (2010) 
argues that the ways in which they respond to 
land-use changes are sufficiently understood 
to enable planning to ameliorate the major 
threats. In the past health systems have some-
times been unable to respond to delivery 
challenges, but new models (often involving 
community volunteers and community-directed 
treatment) are proving to be highly cost-effec-
tive, for example against onchocerciasis and 
guinea worm. Malaria is likely to present the 
greatest challenge, but successful strategies for 
malaria are also now emerging.
On the other hand, agricultural expansion in 
the GS could trigger the emergence of new 
diseases. Jones (2010) cites work showing that 
over 60% of emergent infectious disease events 
worldwide during 1940-2004 were caused by 
zoonotics, three quarters of which emanated 
from wildlife. There is thus an increased likeli-
hood of new emergent diseases as human and 
livestock populations increase in proximity to 
wild animal populations in the GS. Such events 
are, therefore, most likely with expansion in 
livestock production, but there could also be 
indirect impacts through crop agriculture, for 
example via increased rodent populations 
feeding on crops. Of course, the impacts of 
emergent diseases are more serious the weaker 
is the capacity of health systems to deal with 
them. Ceteris paribus, factoring in the likelihood 
of emergent diseases will lower the benefit-cost 
ratio of agricultural expansion in the GS, but 
quantifying the effect is difficult.
Given the political economy factors driving 
interest in this zone, can commercialised agri-
cultural development in the Guinea Savannah 
really be productive, sustainable and 
pro-poor?
Arguably, this is the most critical question of all! 
Amanor (2010) cautions that most processes of 
agricultural commercialisation intensify rural 
differentiation, with large numbers of semi-
subsistence households excluded from the 
immediate benefits. However, given the choice 
between the Thailand (smallholder) model and 
the Brazil (large scale) model, the more desirable 
development pathway for the GS is the Thai 
model. Poulton (2010) argues that smallholders 
Policy Brief 036 | June 2010                                                                                                           www.future-agricultures.org
enjoy a competitive advantage over large farms 
in the production of most staples and other 
major agricultural commodities that are likely 
to be grown in the GS (an exception being 
sugar). As noted above, smallholder systems – 
especially ones that evolve over time in response 
to growth in population and market demand 
– are also likely to be better for biodiversity 
conservation. Binswanger (2010) argues that 
historically large scale farms have only pros-
pered in Africa where they have been able to 
capture some form of public subsidy. Many 
Zimbabwean farmers who have emigrated else-
where within the continent have found life hard 
without it.
However, whilst the desirable development 
pathway for the GS may be the Thai model, 
countries that “wake the sleeping giant” could 
well end up following the Brazil model. Even 
Brazil embarked on its exploitation of the 
cerrado aiming to support poor smallholders 
from the north-east of the country to resettle 
and produce food for domestic markets, yet such 
plans were quickly overtaken by an infl ux of 
enterprising farmers from the south of Brazil 
who were attracted to the cerrado by the oppor-
tunity to acquire much larger landholdings at 
low prices. The cause for pessimism in the GS 
lies in the incentives for politicians to allocate 
land either to local elites (including themselves) 
or to large-scale foreign investors. Such alloca-
tions may be encouraged by pro-large scale 
discourses (e.g. Collier 2008). However, as 
argued by Poulton (2010), it is also simply more 
demanding to initiate smallholder develop-
ment, as this requires provision of a range of 
support services, as well as local infrastructure2. 
Finally, land allocations to the wealthy provide 
opportunities for rent-seeking.
The Sleeping Giant report presents the 
Brazilian cerrado as a major success story, albeit 
an inequitable one. However, it is easy to 
envisage large farm-based scenarios that are 
much less successful in growth terms in Africa 
- especially given the lack of established indig-
enous agricultural entrepreneurs - and that thus 
deliver neither growth nor equity. Speculative 
acquisition of land, which was then held under 
extensive livestock grazing, was a feature of the 
early development of the cerrado. This is also 
likely in the GS, especially if expectations of 
future development of the region grow (a 
possible unintended consequence of the 
report?).
The report highlights the importance of 
strong and equitable land policies, if small-
holders are to be included in the GS develop-
ment trajectory, and comments favourably on 
existing policies (on paper) in some GS coun-
tries. However, there can be a difference 
between policies on paper and their implemen-
tation, as has been shown by some recent land 
deals (Hall 2010). Nevertheless, land policy does 
remain critical. A key concern regarding many 
African countries is the dualism (and the 
resulting tensions and confl icts) between formal 
national land policy and customary tenure 
systems (Mortimore 2010). What is needed is to 
give stronger content to rights in law, accom-
panied by funded and decentralised land rights 
administration, to give local land users the basis 
on which to defend their rights as well as to 
leverage favourable terms when negotiating 
with outside investors.
Given the fear of large farm capture of GS 
development, should Africa’s sleeping agricul-
tural giant be allowed to rest undisturbed for a 
while longer, giving time for more research into 
the environmental resources of the GS, for rising 
populations to lead us towards the decen-
tralised smallholder intensifi cation model that 
has emerged in northern Nigeria and for civil 
society to make progress in demanding state 
accountability as democratisation deepens? A 
counter-argument is that the market and other 
forces encouraging the exploitation of the GS 
are already suffi  ciently strong and only likely to 
intensify, such that exploitation will happen 
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anyway. Then, in the absence of a pro-active 
approach by sympathetic elements within 
governments, development agencies and finan-
cial institutions, exploitation of the GS will follow 
the large farm model almost by default. This 
argument should be carefully assessed in 
different locations within the GS zone. Evidence 
from existing land deals is that these have often 
focused on areas with above-average rainfall 
and accessibility (Hall 2010)3. Thus, they are not 
conclusive evidence that the GS as a whole is 
about to be targeted for investment. However, 
where the argument is considered valid, what 
might a pre-emptive pro-smallholder develop-
ment strategy look like?
There are two challenges here. The first is that 
allocation of land to large-scale farms may be 
catalysed by a subset of the investments needed 
for smallholder development (albeit still with 
hidden demands for subsidies). Thus, in a favour-
able macro-economic and political environ-
ment, road investment in the GS zone is likely 
to trigger interest in land for large-scale farms, 
even though this is insufficient to catalyse small-
holder development. The second is that the 
champions of a pro-smallholder development 
strategy are likely to be technocrats (interna-
tional agencies plus sympathetic local bureau-
crats) whose intentions are often thwarted by 
domestic political elites (van de Walle 2001). It 
is these elites who are likely to favour large-scale 
land allocations.
Could farmer organisations provide a credible 
alternative to a large-scale farm model, espe-
cially where there is pressure for large volumes 
from downstream actors in global (or even 
regional) supply chains? Farmer organisations 
have a mixed history in Africa (Future Agricultures 
Consortium 2009). However, even when and 
where they have been successful, they have 
tended to emerge once there is a vibrant 
commercial agricultural sector, i.e. existing agri-
business investment plus smallholder suppliers, 
already in place. 
The first recommendation, therefore, is: 
proceed with caution! Don’t put roads in where 
there is no clear plan for smallholder inclusion 
and/or where land law is weak! Similarly, don’t 
invest in large-scale enterprises where the busi-
ness model is ultimately dependent on some 
form of state subsidy (however well hidden). On 
the other hand, where credible large-scale 
enterprises are keen to invest, attention needs 
to be paid to existing land rights and tenure 
arrangements. Even where land is apparently 
“under-utilised”, it is almost certain to be claimed 
and used by someone. Taking their rights seri-
ously can avert conflict and enable wider sharing 
of benefits from new investments. Public funds 
may also be deployed to leverage smallholder 
inclusion, either as formal outgrowers (where 
the attributes of the major crop are compatible 
with this) or as settlers in the vicinity of the enter-
prise, able to benefit from the infrastructure and 
market linkages that accompany the large-scale 
investment4. Finally, however, it is worth reiter-
ating that it it the Thai (smallholder-led) model 
for development of the GS that is likely to 
generate the broadest social and economic 
benefits, with lower environmental costs - if 
coalitions to promote such a model can be 
formed. 
(Endnotes)
1   This policy brief draws on the contributions to a joint 
Future Agricultures and SOAS workshop on “Awakening 
Africa’s Sleeping Giant?” held at SOAS on June 21st-22nd 
2010. Unless otherwise shown in the reference list, all 
references in the brief are to presentations made at the 
workshop. Further details of the workshop can be found at 
www.future-agricultures.org, from where the presenta-
tions can also be downloaded.
2    Note that the issue here is the capacity of the state to 
provide these services, rather than the cost, given the 
tendency of large-scale farms also to negotiate subsidies.
3   For this reason external investors have come into direct 
conflict with small-scale farmers, precipitating displace-
ment and anti-poor outcomes (Hall 2010).
4   For a recent review of public-private partnerships in 
African agricultural development, see Poulton (2009).
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